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NORMAN LEONARD*
Successful completion of a plaintiff's case for damages includes both
proof of the wrongful act and proof of the money amount of damages.'
Failure to prove amount prevents recovery. Although proof of amount
has less rigid legal standards than proof of wrongful act, it still must be
proved, not merely alleged or argued. 2 Proof depends upon economic
data, and proof sometimes fails because of the inadequacy of such data.3
The Philosophy of Market Value (or Price)
Damages are measured in judicial law by a process utilizing the econ-
omist's concept of "market value.' 4  Where a reasonably dear market
value cannot be ascertained, various substitutes or surrogates are used,
such as reproduction cost,5 reasonable or actual value to owner,6 before
and after value of assets,7 comparable value of other assets8 and others.
They are accepted as measures because they are the nearest to market price
which can be obtained with the data and under the circumstances.
Judicial law uses "market price" or "market value" in damage deter-
mination because it is the sole rational means of attaining the optimum use
of resourcesY Optimum is used here to mean the maximization of human
satisfactions, ° an economic dimension of the liberal humanist goal of
"'the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers."' Judicial law uses
* Professor of Economics, Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, Ohio; President-Elect of the
American Society of Econometric Appraisers.
f The author wishes to express his thanks for the assistance of Mr. Robert Thompson and
Mr. John Luikart, undergraduate students at Ohio Wesleyan University.
'Wise v. Western Union Telephgraph Co., 37 Del. 209, 181 A. 302 (1935); Mayor, Alder-
man & Commonality of the City of New York v. Ransom, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 487 (1859).
2 Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pic-
tures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
3 Proof of amount in cases of wrongful death has been covered in Leonard, Future Economic
Value in Wrongful Death Litigation, 30 OHio ST. LJ. 502 (1969).
4 Hedderman v. Robert Hall of Waterbury, Inc., 145 Conn. 410, 144 A.2d 60 (1958);
Covey v. Western Tank Lines, Inc., 36 Wash. 2d 381,218 P.2d 322 (1950).
1; Ford Motor Co. v. Bradley Transp. Co., 174 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1949).
0 Lobell v. Paleg, 154 N.Y.S.2d 709 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct 1956).
7 fBigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
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0 Even economies bases on central planning often seek and use this concept of value in
determining resource allocation. See 0. LANGE, ON THE ECONoMIc THEORY OF SOCIALISM,
(1948).
10 See W. STARK, JEREiY BENTHAM'S ECONOMIC WRITINGS (published for the Royal
Economic Society by Allen and Unwin, London, 1952-54).
1 From Francis Hutcheson, Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil, 1720. See W. R.
ScoTT, FRANCxs HUTCHESON, HIS LIFE, TEAcHING, AND POSITION IN THE HISTORY OF
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market price because its task is to make the aggrieved whole, that is, it
attempts to place him where he would have been in a free market, instead
of where he is as a result of a wrongful act. The money amount of
damages is the difference between a free market price and a price attained
under conditions flowing from the wrongful act.
A philosophical defense of market price is its capacity to equate the
displeasure of. work with the pleasure of use of that produced. Alfred
Marshall, one of the greatest economists, has written:
The simplest case of balance or equilibrium between desire and effort
is found when a person satisfies one of his wants by his own direct work.
When a boy picks blackberries for his own eating, the action of picking is
probably itself pleasurable for a while; and for some time longer the
pleasure of eating is more than enough to repay the trouble of picking.
But after he has eaten a good deal, the desire for more diminishes; while
the task of picking begins to cause weariness, which may indeed be a feel-
ing of monotony rather than of fatigue. Equilibrium is reached when at
last his eagerness to play and his disinclination for the work of picking
counterbalance the desire for eating. The satisfaction which he can get
from picking fruit has arrived at its maximum: for up to that time every
fresh picking has added more to his pleasure than it has taken away; and
after that time any further picking would take away from his pleasure
more than it would add.' 2
The comparison of work to produce with satisfaction in use is not
ordinarily as direct and immediate as with the blackberry picker. But
money costs are related to the pain cost of production and sales price to
the satisfactions of use. To the extent that money reflects psychic values,
market price is the optimum price. As with the berry picker, as each prod-
uct adds more pleasure than is taken away by costs of producing it, then
production continues. When additional output would cause more displeasure
than pleasure, then production ceases. In this way the price mechanism
establishes a market price which maximizes human satisfaction, and moves
toward the greatest good of the greatest number. This is the normative
judgment of our political and economic society. The judicial quest for a
formula for damages based on market price is an inextricable part of a
liberal society.
Characteristics of a Free Market
If judicial law is to approximate the result that would be attained in
a free market, jurists must recognize certain essential characteristics of
such a market.
A free competitive market is a geographical area in which large num-
bers of buyers and sellers (with buyers under no compulsion to buy or
12 A. MARSHALL, PINCIPLES OF ECONOMIcs, 331 (8th ed. 1920) [hereinafter cited as
MARSHALL).
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sellers to sell) meet to establish a price for homogeneous items which
clears the market. The market concept is instantaneous in time and is at a
specific geographic location.' 3 14  "Thus the more perfect a market is, the
stronger is the tendency for the same price to be paid for the same thing at
the same time in all parts of the market . '. ."15 If the same price does
prevail then judicial law can simply use the publicly quoted price.
Now suppose the court must decide value (market price) for an asset
where no transactions took place on the crucial date. Or suppose the
court must decide the value where the item to be valued has changed over
time. (For example: What is value of a closely-held corporation on July
20, 1970, where there was a significant change in management on July 19,
1970?) Or suppose the asset to be valued has disappeared before the valu-
ation is made? (For example: Valuation of a corporation destroyed by an
anti-trust violation.) Or suppose there are many prospective buyers but
a single seller? (For example: A rare stamp.) Or suppose there are many
prospective sellers but a single buyer? (For example: Labor being supplied
in a small town to the sole manufactuuring enterprise). Sometimes the
difficulty is time, sometimes place, sometimes the nature of markets, some-
times the changes in the item being valued. In these cases there is no
"market price," and courts must use substitutes based on partial informa-
tion and analyses.
Some Partial Views of Market Price
What is a reasonable market value where there is no market? The
judicial formulas of 1) before and after, 2) comparability, and 3) prices
for specific losses (customers, assets, etc.) are obviously partial answers.
They are partial because each corrects only one item on which the data for
market determination is deficient. "Before and after" attempts to correct
for no sale on the relevant date. "Comparability" attempts to use another
item (firm, asset) as a yardstick. Prices for specific losses (customers,
assets, etc.) apply only those items mentioned, without measurement of
the effect of those items on the overall position of the firm. If partials
are all that is available, they must be used, but the concept of the whole
free market should remain the ideal. Judicial determination of the amount
of damages should push as far as possible toward the wholeness of the
free market by combining as many partials as available, and adding the
professional judgment of an appropriately chosen expert economist.
13 There are of course markets for "future delivery," but the price is instantaneous in time.
14 The geographic area may be small, as in a single room, or large as where stocks are traded
over-the-counter by buyers and sellers brought together by telephone communication. In
either case there is a market because of the coming together of offers to buy and sell at a de-
finable time and place.
15 MARSHALL, supra note 12, at 325.
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Historical, or "Before and After" Net Earnings
A substantial number of cases use an historical approach to damages,
sometimes referred to as the "before and after" formula. This formula
has the implicit assumption that a reasonable substitute market price can
be determined if the "time difficulty" is removed. Thus the value of a
firm or other asset can be measured before and after a wrongful act and
the damages measured by the difference. This method is widely used in
anti-trust cases. 16
Even so simple (simple, not easy) a method has its problems. The
courts have used before and after dates to mean: filing date,'7 date of
decree,' 8 a future or prospective date,"9 "normal" immediately prior,20 and
damage period.21  The appropriate date should depend on judgment and
on circumstances, especially the availability of data.
Net earnings, or net profit lost is the preferred measure under the be-
fore and after formula. 22  But many other measures (partials) have been
permitted, including reduced price per unit times number of units,23 the
drop in price after the indictment,4 and the trend of profits including
future profits.25 They are all used as means of reasonably approximating
net profit lost.
Comparable Business as Measure of Market Value
Where it is impossible to obtain sufficient reliable information on net
earnings for the wronged firm, the amount of damages may be proved by
use of a "comparable firm." The firm used should have essential charac-
teristics as near as possible to the wronged firm. These essential charac-
teristics may include size, industry, time period, nature of markets and
16Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946); Story Parchment Co. v.
Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo
Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
17 Volasco Prod. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962).
18Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 297 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 865 (1962).
19 Anvil Mining Co. v. Humble, 153 U.S. 540 (1894).
20 Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
21 Sablosky v. Paramount Firlm Distrib. Corp., 137 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
2 2 Momand v. Universal Film Exchs., Inc., 172 F.2d 37 (1st Cit. 1948). This case used an-
other standard in addition. Also Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
This case uses differences in film rentals as the only cost which changed in the before and after
comparison. This case also uses another standard in addition. In Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927), the court approved gross profits minus
cost of handling additional goods. The courts have rejected "partials" for net earnings where
the evidence was not convincing.
23 Dean Foods Co. v. Albrecht Dairy Co., 396 F.2d 652 (8th Cir. 1968).
24 Ohio Valley Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914, (S.D. N.Y. 1963); and
Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 308 F.2d 856 (3rd Cir. 1962).
2 5 William H. Rankin Co. v. Associated Bill Posters, 42 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1930).
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input conditions, etc. The studied firm becomes the substitute for the ag-
grieved firm, and its net earnings are ascribed to the wronged firm.26
Measurement of Damages by Special Items
Measurement of damages is sometimes as simple as computing differ-
ence between legal (market) price and wrongful price and multiplying by
number of units sold.27  The courts do not ordinarily attempt to measure
the impact on price of the changed quantity purchased. 8 Sometimes the
measure is lost profit per unit times number of units,29 (number of units
supplied, rather than those contracted for).30 Finally, the courts have
been known to accept "receipts before and after" where respondent pre-
vented better data being obtained. "[JJuries are allowed to act on prob-
able and inferential, as well as upon direct and positive proof.' "31
Market Value Decisions of the
Securities and Exchange Commission
The measurement of market value is also carried on by the Securities
and Exchange Commission and by other quasi-judicial institutions.32  In
each of these bodies there arises a series of precedents which give some
guidance on determining market value. Although differing in detail from
other bodies, the Securities and Exchange Commission experience is useful
and relevant. 33
The Securities and Exchange Commission, acting in more than 1,000
individual cases, has in effect rejected a formula approach and sustained
the ideas of inclusiveness, perception of important distinctions, and rea-
sonableness. Stated differently, it has adopted a philosophy of wholeness,
2 0 Use of this yearstick is approved in Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S.
251 (1946), where a competing firm was used. Where there is no comparable firm in the
geographic area, a nearby city may be used. Elyria-Lorain Broadcasting Co. v. Lorain Journal
Co., 358 F.2d 790 (6th Cit. 1966). Where size is the only impediment to comparability, a
larger firm may be used and made comparable to the smaller by dividing appropriate amounts.
Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 211 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955). Where there is a bilateral
monopoly (a single supplier dealing with a single buyer) the measure of plaintiff's loss may be
the defendant's gain. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley (10th Cir. 1961). In some cir-
cumstances, comparability is accepted as between a single enterprise and a chain, in spite of
many other differences. Goldman Theaters v. Loew's Inc., 69 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Pa. 1946),
164 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 811 (1948).
27 City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works, 127 F. 23 (6th Cit. 1903).
2 8 North Texas Producers Association v. Young, 308 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1962).
29 Clapper v. Original Tractor Cab Co., 270 F.2d 616 (7th Cit. 1959), cert. denied; 361
U.S. 967 (1960).
30 Guerini Stone Co. v. P. J. Carlin Constr. Co., 240 U.S. 264 (1916).
31 Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251,264 (1946).
32For example: The Federal Power Commission and Interstate Commerce Commission.
3 3 BOSLAND, C., VALUATION THEORIES AND DEcISIONS OF THE SECURITIES AND EX-
CHANGE COMMISSION, Simmons-Boardman Publishing Co., (1964). This is the major source
for the S.E.C. section.
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but has accepted possible and reasonable partials as a sufficient substitute
for the unattainable whole.
The sole requirement in determining value is that it must be based on
earning power, or where available, on actual market quotations or trans-
actions. The Commission may consider book value, capital structure, ex-
cess working capital, dividends, cash flows, liquidating value, cash position,
good will and others. These are accepted because they shed some light
and help build a broad perspective.
How are earnings best measured? The Commission has shown a pref-
erence for recent or prospective earnings and earnings trends rather than
a long earnings history.
After earnings have been determined, the next step is to multiply
earnings by a reasonable and proper rate of capitalization to obtain rea-
sonable market value. Earnings multiplied by the rate of capitalization
equals market value. The same conclusion may be obtained by using a
reasonable rate of return for a firm of that kind, in that industry, at that
particular time. Suppose 81 2% is chosen. Divide 100 by 8 1/% and the
result is the rate of capitalization. Still another way of expressing the
same idea is the price/earnings ratio. The ratio is obtained by studying
the most nearly relevant firms in the same industry on the same date. The
price/earnings ratio is also the rate by which earnings of the firm being
evaluated should by capitalized.
The Securities and Exchange Commission experience is useful in de-
termining how value is determined, but it yields little or no quantitative
guidance. The Commission accepted a range of rates of capitalization of
more than 26 to less than 2.4 (Based on rates of return of 3.8% to 42%)
in the more than 1,000 cases studied by Professor Bosland.34 No signif-
icant explanation is made of the difference except where based on actual
markets or price/earnings ratios of similar companies. In most cases, ma-
jority and minority interests were evaluated on a pro rata basis (i.e., no
addition was made for having effective control and no subtraction for the
absence of such control), no distinction was made for size of company or
industry and excess assets were not usually treated separately.
The history of S.E.C. philosophy and experience shows a rejection of
formulas and quantification, and the use of judgment in determining both
earnings and the appropriate rate of capitalization.
Some Recent Ohio Case Law on Market Value
Ohio, in common with some other jurisdictions, measures damages in
business losses on the basis of a comparison of before and after value of
34 As for example the ten year record of earnings urged in Taylor v. B. Heller & Co., 364 F.2d
608 (6th Cir. 1966); Lloyd v. Lloyd Bros. Pharmacists, Inc., 29 Ohio L. Abs. 225, (C.P. Ham. Co.
1939).
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the business. 3 Value of the business may be capitalization of past prof-
its,30 or may be based on future lost profits provided plaintiff "makes it
reasonably certain by competent proof what the amount of his loss actually
is."3'  Future profits must be used with care or they may not be accepted.38
What historical record of earnings establishes earning capacity? In
Ohio law there is an exact formula which uses a weighted average. Take
net earnings for each of the ten years preceding the wrongful act: Weight
the nearest year 10, the second year 9, etc. and compute the weighted
average.30 This extraordinarily detailed and exact formula seems unfortu-
nate to the author, but it does make dear the increasing importance of
historical data as it approaches the measurement date. In the present U.S.
economy there is no such thing as a regular ten year "complete business
cycle," and this standard should be replaced by expert opinion on the
appropriate period, buttressed by data on the industry and the economy.40
In contrast to the exact formula for measuring earnings, the rate by
which earnings are capitalized permits wide discretion to the jury under
proper instructions concerning tangible and intangible property.41 A com-
parison of earnings rates is made with prevailing rates of return on similar
enterprises.4 This permits the reasonable flexibility necessary in an econ-
omy where rates of profit vary significantly, and permits the desirable dis-
cretion to expert opinion apparently denied in the definition of earnings.
The Whole View of Market Price4'
The whole view of market price may be best explained by the concept
of a "going business." A going business is different from and more than
35 Taylor v. B. Heller & Co., 364 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1966).
36 Bishop v. East Ohio Gas Co., 41 Ohio L. Abs. 353 (Ct. App. 1943).
37 16 0. Jur. 2d Damages § 80 (1955). See also Myers v. Sunlight Laundry Co., 10 0.
App. 275 (Ct. App. Ham. Co. 1918), and Hinde and D. Paper Co. v. Wainwright Coal Co., 19
Ohio Dec. 139 (Super. Ct. 1908); Fremont Oil Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 26 Ohio Op. 2d 109
(C.P. Sand. Co.), 192 N.E.2d 123 (1963).
38 Zimmerman v. Isaly Dairy Co., 165 Ohio St. 354, 135 N.E.2d 338 (1956); Taylor v.
B. Heller and Co., 364 F.2d 608 (1966).
39 Ten years is referred to as "a complete business cycle." Lloyd v. Lloyd Bros. Pharmacists,
Inc., 29 Ohio L. Abs. 225 (C.P. Ham. Co. 1939).
40 Since economists do not recognize a ten year cycle of profits, the ten years standard be-
comes quite arbitrary. In addition, it is so long that it makes probable rather basic changes
in management, production functions or in the nature of input and output markets. A pref-
erable standard would be based on expert opinion after the expert has studied the significant
variables. The relation of these variables to the period chosen should be explained to the jury.
This would of course permit different time periods in different cases.
41Bishop v. East Ohio Gas Co., 41 Ohio L. Abs. 353, 370 (Ct. App. 1943), "[wlhere a
business to be capitalized consists wholly of intangible property... the rate of return should be
fixed at a higher percentage than where... [it] consists wholly or partly of tangible property."
42 Id.
43 An excellent short treatment of the economic nature of market price is available in A.
DEvING, THE RNANCIAL PoLicy op CopoRArioNs chs. 10-12 (5th Ed. 1953) [hereinafter
cited as DEwING].
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the sum of its tangible and intangible assets. These assets are "partials"
which are necessary but insufficient to complete the whole. Usefulness44
(utility) and scarcity45 are also "partials," and may be appraised by formu-
las for partials.4" But a going business
is a unity of men and property dedicated to the specific purpose of per-
forming an economic service at a profit. This unity persists as the human
beings who operate it come and go, as the material goods are made and
sold, and as its fixed properties and machines decay and are replaced by
new.
4 7
Appraisal of a going business should consider the partials, but its major
consideration should be the effectiveness of the whole in obtaining money
profits.
The difference between the value of a going business and the sum of
its tangible and intangible assets is organization of men and property in
the quest for profit. It is based on the human ability to learn from experi-
ence, to motivate, and to govern. It is not "a parcel of boilers and vats,
but the potentiality of growing rich, beyond the dreams of avarice."48
It is best measured in the present by the prospects for future net earnings.4 9
Capitalization of Earnings [Price-Earnings Ratio]
The primary purpose of a going business is to make net earnings or
profit. Net earnings reflect the conditions of supply and cost, the condi-
tions and characteristics of the market for output, and the skill and efficiency
of production. They are the measure of accomplishment and ability of a
business enterprise.
Net earnings reflect the past insofar as the past is significant to the
present and future. They show the influence of the future insofar as the
future affects the present. Thus the single item net profits, although in-
stantaneous in time, expresses the market appraisal of forces over time.
Since the purpose of a going enterprise is to gain net earnings, the
valuation of an enterprise must be related to earnings.50 51 There is no
fully successful substitute, not in gross earnings, or lost markets, or changed
4 4 MAXSHALL, supra note 12, at 369.
451d. at 370.
40 Partials include salvage value, real asset value and transferable portions in intangible
values.
4 7 D rwiNG, supra note 43, at 281.
4 8 BOSWELL, J., IIFE OF DR. JOHNSON 380 (1791). Quoted from DEwING, supra note 43,
at 286.
49 "The use of book values ... is generally condemned as unsound." Ahlenius v. Bann &
Humphreys, 358 Ill. 155, 169 (1934).
50Justice 0. W. Holmes in Galveston Ry Co. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217, 226 (1908), said
. the commercial value of property consists in the expectation of income from it...."
51 Should annual capacity to earn be based on a single year? five years? There is no sure rule,
except that it should be long enough to ". . . cover a sufficient period to show the settled condi-
tion of things...." Louisville and N. IL Co. v. Coulter, 131 F. 282,304 (1903).
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costs. These are useful in valuation only where net earnings cannot be
ascertained. (For example, in a comparison of before and after, where
the firm no longer exists, or in the case of a new business).
At what multiple of net annual earnings should a going business be
appraised? Corporations do not have a life limited by charter or law.
It would be unreasonable to equate damages to a single year's lost net
earnings. It would be equally unreasonable to multiply the annual loss
by infinity or even 100. The annual impact of an act in year one is
usually greater than in year two, in year two greater than year three, and so
on. Why? Because in each subsequent year there is a rise of risk that
the estimated net earnings may not be attained due to the passage of time
(related to the pure interest rate), and to events that occur in the firm, the
industry, and the economy. (Summarized by the "gross" interest rate).
How should a rate of capitalization be estimated? The rate depends
on prevailing interest rates on date of evaluation (or trial), the nature of
the firm and its management, the industry, and the national economy. The
greater the risk the lower the multiple. The appropriate multiple de-
pends on all the relevant facts and on their interpretation by the economist
making the evaluation.
The professional opinion of the economist on the appropriate rate of
capitalization depends on many variables, including the nature of the
enterprise. Contrast the difference in reasonable rates of return, as inter-
preted by the money and capital markets in 1965 and in 1970. Contrast
the difference between a public utility and an electronics firm with the
Department of Defense as its sole or major customer. There may be cases
of multiples as low as one (for a personal services firm after death of a
sole proprietor) to above 100 (for a new issue of a favorite industry dur-
ing a period of exuberance on the stock market). The multiple for all
stocks in the Dow-Jones Industrial Index on August 21, 1970 was 13.7.52
The Securities and Exchange Commission accepted multiples of 8.33 to 11.5
in 1940.11 The choice of a rate of capitalization is dearly a matter of
professional judgment in the light of the circumstances.
Some Examples of Valuation: A. B. Momand v.
Universal Film Exchanges, Inc., et. al.
172 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948)-l
Alomand was brought under Section 7 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
and Section 4 of the Clayton Act. The plaintiff, a realtor and theater
operator, sought damages after the defendant had been found guilty of
52 Wall Street Journal, Aug. 24,1970, at 21, col.-.
63 Securities and Exchange Commission, Report re. Minn. and Ontario Paper Co. (Report
No. 11640) at 12 (August 26, 1940).
54The full transcript of the record of the District Court (2,014 pages) was kindly loaned
by Mr. Dana H. Gallup, Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, 1st Cir., Boston, Massachusetts.
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monopolizing activity (in arbitration and credit policies) in a suit brought
by the United States.
The plaintiff based proof of amount of damages on reductions in gross
revenue 55 and on declines in profit."6  The "before" year chosen was 1927,
probably because that was prior to the first alleged wrongful act.57 The
theater owner testified on what revenue and profits would have been in
the absence of the wrongful act.58
Proof of amount of damages involved rather unsophisticated use of eco-
nomic variables. The year 1927 was considered as a "standard year" for
profits59 in spite of the knowledge of the Great Depression. Adjustments
for the Depression were made by evidence of the lower prices for crude
oi60 (1931-33), presumably thinking prices of a major industry should be
related to prices and profits of motion picture theaters. A witness testi-
fied that the Depression reduced gross revenues and property values by 20
to 25o, but gave no detailed accounting.6 1 Comparisons were also made
with gross income of two large motion picture distributing companies.6 2
The plaintiff relied for testimony on a former oil company auditor and
on employees of the plaintiff. The testimony shows very little perception
of important economic relationships, relying on masses of ill-digested data
rather than professional analysis.
Attorneys for the plaintiff computed damages from the testimony by
adding together the loss of receipts, the loss of equipment to foreclosure,
and loss of future earning capacity of the business. 3 ( Future earnings
loss was computed as the sum of profits for three immediately preceding
years or three times the earnings of the first preceding year." Neither
the summary or the data upon which it was allegedly based was contested
by the defendants. At least one writer believes the summary involved
double counting,66 but whether the jury counted earnings twice is unclear,
since the verdict shows no ascertainable relationship to the various items.
Economic analysis can provide a better guide to appraisal of damages than
was used in Momand.
55 See Schedule A (Summary of Plaintifl's Assessment), at 217-220 Volume L
56 Id.
5T Id.
581d. at 605, Vol. II.
59 ld. at 697-99.
60 d.
61 Id. at 685.
621d. at 1159-60, Vol. IIL
631d. at 1245.
64 1d. at 655-6, Vol. II and at 1046, Vol. HL
65 Id. at 633-6, Vol. II.
6 6 Guilfoil, Damage Determination in Private Anti-Tiust Sits, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW 647
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Guilfoil, Damages].
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Dean Foods v. Albrecht Dairy67
396 F.2d 37 (8th Cir. 1968)
Dean Foods was found to have violated a state anti-trust law (Missouri
Unfair Milk Practices Act § 416.415) by illegal pricing practices. An
expert witness for Albrecht, a Certified Public Accountant, computed loss
as number of sales during the violation period multiplied by the differ-
ence in price before and after Dean's illegal acts. Changes in gross sales
were used because Albrecht, a new company, had been operating at a
loss up to the date of trial.
This case is significant, in part, because of its omissions. No claim was
made for loss of percentage of market penetration, or even for loss of sales
during the violation period. No adjustment was made on the cost side
to reflect the relationships of changed cost to profit position. Even some
usual cost items (milkmen's commission, bad debt) were omitted from
the calculation.
There is a strong probability that the legal judgment did not fully
and completely end the consequences of the wrongful act. The damages
were for the period from entry into the market to the date of the court's
judgement. But Dean Foods remained a seller in this market after the
trial. Perhaps the legal judgement should have included an amount for
long-term damage, computed as reasonably probable lost earnings multi-
plied by a reasonable and proper rate of capitalization.
Selectomark Corporations
Question: What is the reasonable market value for the Selectomark Corp.?
The expert dismissed book value as not controlling, as it represented
a static and historical view only. He rejected a single actual sale value
as not controlling because it was a sale of a small minority position to a
majority stockholder who was also the managerial authority. The expert
noted, but did not evaluate, the single patent of importance. Evaluation
was based on general knowledge, including book, actual sale, and patent
values but was based primarily on capitalization of earnings.
Earnings trends of the Selectomark Corporation were studied in an
effort to evaluate the damages sustained. The last year showed net
earnings of $8,000. Price earnings ratios were studied in the economy
generally and in most nearly comparable industries as of the date of the
wrongful act. The ratios varied from 24 to 13 for the comparable in-
dustries, and 16 for companies included in the Dow Jones Industrial In-
dex, 18 for those in Moodys, 23 for all stocks listed on the American
67 The full transcript of the record of the Circuit Court (616 pages) was kindly supplied
by Mr. Robert Tucker, Clerk, U. S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit, St. Louis, Missouri.
6S This is an actual case with names and amounts altered. The author testified as the ex-
pert witness in this case.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Exchange, and a little over 12 for all U.S. corporations. Since Selecto-
mark was unlisted and closely held, the expert decided on a price-earnings
ratio of at least 10,69 and therefore an uncorrected value of $80,000 (10 x
$8,000). This preliminary figure was based on the "before and after"
formula, using net profits as a criterion of value.
The simple application of the "before and after" formula and of net
earnings does not take into account the possible distortion of earnings
where the majority ownership and managerial powers are concentrated
in the same hands. In Selectomark there appeared to the expert to be a
payment of excessive and unreasonable salary income to an individual,
which improperly reduced net earnings and therefore value based upon
them. A detailed study was made of comparable labor markets for in-
dividuals of the same age, sex, race, education, training and experience.
The amount by which actual salary exceeded a reasonable market value
was called "excess salary," and the amount of the excess salary was added
to net profits. With the new profits multiplied by 10 (as before) the ap-
praisal of damages came to $148,000.
The Selectomark appraisal shows the importance of expert economic
testimony. It utilized the approved "before and after" formula and capi-
talization of net income; but it also made a judgement that net earnings
had been misstated and was able to place a value on the corporation which
was probably more nearly accurate.
Expert Testimony
Legal justice depends upon the sound discretion of judge or jury.
This discretion should rest in part on the understanding which is avail-
able from appropriately chosen expert witnesses. 70  The expert witness
technique has been called 'the institutionalization of the function of trans-
ferring scientific knowledge to social use" 71 and of course to the attain-
ment of private justice.
The task of the expert witness is to supply factual information, rele-
vant scientific relationships and his best professional opinion to assist the
judge and jury.72  The expert should explain dearly what he did, why he
did it, and its exact relationship to the value to which he testifies. Since
the jury makes the judgement, the expert should emphasize in his testimony
6 9 M. GORDON, INVESTMENT, FINANCING AND VALUATION OF A CORPORATION, 39
(1962) "The most widely recommended figure is the corporations price-earnings ration. .. "
70 H. OLEciC, DAMAGES TO PERSONS AND PRoPBRTY Paragraph 966.2 (1961); Camden &
A. R. Co. v. Williams, 61 N.J.L. 646,40 A. 634 (1898).
71 Mesthene, How Technology Will Shape the Future, Science 11, (1968).
72 Expert testimony is particularly valuable in assessing such intangible factors as market
forces. Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1957) or the plaintiff firm's competi-
tive standing in ability of management and acquired good will. Bordonaro Brothers Theaters,
Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc, 176 F.2d 594 (2d Cit. 1949); William Goldman Theaters,
Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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those facts and relationships that form a part of his expertise, rather than
just supplying a figure. This permits the jury to rely on expert knowl-
edge where they are excluded by their lay knowledge and experience, and
to use their own judgement where expert knowledge is not determining.
In cases in which the judge is confident of a means of computing dam-
ages, he may so instruct the jury. Often he is unsure, and so he leaves
the jury to its own devices. When cases are very complex, both judge
and jury may become confused as to the proper amount of damages.
Some judges have been very frank about the difficulties. In Reserve Plan,
Inc. v. Arthur Murray, Inc.73 the judge wrote "[c]ertainly there should
be a better method than having a judge, untrained and unassisted.., sift
the raw material... for the purpose of ascertaining plaintiff's damage ....
[He refers to] [o]ur tedious and almost vexed attempt to decide the
damage issue..., [and says elsewhere:) a judge simply is not trained to
perform [such) duties. . . ."7 The expert witness has special education
and experience which makes him useful in many cases involving the
amount of damages. The check on his opinion is the professional opinion
of the expert on the other side. "The weight to be accorded evidence
which is based upon estimates ... depends upon an evaluation of the rela-
tive probabilities that one party's estimates will prove more accurate than
the others."75
An appropriately chosen expert economic witness will use all relevant
data on damages, and try to reconstruct a free market. Since data are
never complete, the reconstruction depends in part on his judgement as to
what the free market would have been like had there been one. Some-
times this involves estimating net revenue by subtracting estimated ex-
penses from estimated gross revenue 78 Sometimes it involves future and
increased profits. 7  Sometimes it depends on special studies or surveys.7 8
In every case it involves an attempt to build a "mental construct" or image
as near as possible to a free market. Of equal importance with adequate
and accurate data on the firm is the careful analysis of industry-wide and
economy-wide influences. 79  There is no adequate substitute for expert
opinion based on the best data available. 0
73 38 F.R.D. 23, (W.D. Mo. 1965).
74 Id. at 34.
775 A. C. Gecken Co. v. Gemex Corp., 199 F. Supp. 544, 553 (N.D. Ill. 1961), aff'd 314 F.2d
839 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 816 (1963).
7o Sablosky v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 137 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
77 William H. Rankin Co. v. Associated Bill Posters, 42 F.2d 152 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied,
282 U.S. 864 (1930).
78 Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416,427 (10th Cir. 1952).
7'1 Normand v. Thomas Theater Corp., 349 Mich. 50, 84 N.W.2d 451 (1957); McWeeney
v. New York, N.H. and H. RRL, 282 F.2d 34, 38 (2nd Cir. 1960); Frey & Son v. Welch Grapejuice Co., 240 F. 114 (4th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 251 U.S. 551 (1919).
80Dewing, supra note 43, at 379. "At best, as in the case of all economic values, human
judgment is the ultimate criterion; but a human judgment which has surveyed the problem
1970]
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A Provocative Confusion
A proper damage formula for destruction of a business is reasonable
net earnings multiplied by a reasonable and proper rate of capitalization.
Where damage less than destruction ceases on date of trial or order, a
proper formula is based on lost net earnings. But what is a proper meas-
ure where damage continues in part after the judicial decision?
The case law is somewhat confused on damages only partially ended
by the courts. The court in Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment
Paper Co.,' provided two items for the jury to use: lost profits (the usual)
plus the diminishment in the value of the petitioner's property. Dr. Guil-
foil 82 believes this amounts to double counting of lost profits, even though
the Court did not use capitalized earnings as the measure of diminishment
in the value of the property.83 In Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co.,84 the
court used the usual means plus loss of sales position in the market. In
Atlas Building Products Co. v. Diamond Block and Gravel Co.,85 the court
said damages should be based on "profit or net worth of... assets .... 8
argued that the statute permits use of both profits and net worth, and then
concluded that the size of the damages (very low) precludes serious in-
justice to the defendant. In Union Carbide and Carbon Co. v. Nisley,87
the court said "[wle know that loss of profits and diminishment of as-
sets are proper elements of damage... ,"88 but on the confusion concern-
ing double counting of profits said 'all of these discrepancies, inconsis-
tencies, and even incongruities were for the jury. . . ...8 In Volasco
Products Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 0 the court did not use dimin-
ishment of value because evidence did not show it separately, and because
plaintiff was fully compensated by lost profits and prevented by injunc-
tion from further losses.
A Proposal: The Full Value Theory of Damages
When a jury finds that a wrongful act has occurred, it also determines
the money amount of compensatory damages. These damages should
from all angles and given due weight to the distinction between the factors which are of casual
significance ... and those underlying causes and influences which are abiding. The result is a
figure...."
81282 U.S. 555 (1931).
8 2 Guilfoil, Damages, supra note 66.
88 The court used book value.
84 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952).
85 269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1959).
86Id, at 958.
87 300 F.2d 561 (loth Cir. 1961).
881d. at 595.
89 Id,
90 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962).
[Vol. 31
MEASUREMENT OF DAMAGES
place the plaintiff in the financial position he would have held in the
absence of the wrongful act."
The present legal method of compensation for business damages is to
reimburse the plaintiff for his profits lost during the violation.2 To do
this, some decision must be made on what profits would have been during
this period. Courts, apparently taking the economy as generally static,
often use a flat line extension of average net earnings from previous years
(e.g., in Ohio a ten year weighted average). 0  Such an extension does
not recognize that business earnings are generally rising over time. 4 An
upward correction of earnings, where appropriate, should be made by an
economic expert and is represented in Table No. 1 by line segment FJ, the
continuation of the actual earnings line EF. This continuation is an ap-
proximation of net earnings of the business without unlawful interference.
The actual earnings line, (EFG), is linked downward after the wrong-
ful act and might continue downward until the date of the trial when the
illegal act was stopped (at JG).
The present amount of damages is the difference between the aver-
aged earnings extension (CD) and the downward sloping actual earnings
line (CG),1 represented by the area CDG. To replace all lost profits
to date of trial (JG), it is necessary to use the area between the projected
earnings line (FJ) and the actual earnings line (FG) represented by the
area FGJ. The triangle FGJ shows the reasonably probable loss of profits
due to the tort and measures the full compensation to date of trial (JG).
The courts' present theory often takes for granted that all losses to
the business are temporary and are completely erased at the date of trial.
If this is true, the plaintiff can be completely restored by a judgement the
size of triangle FGJ. But suppose there is a continuing injury (such as
reduction in percentage of market) caused by the illegal act? What if the
actual net earnings do not rise to point J immediately after the date of
the trial? If the actual net earning resume somewhere below point J
then there has been some measurable continuing damage. A change in
market penetration or some other continuing damage has occurred and the
judgement should include the loss in value of the business.
The continuing loss in value can be shown by the difference between
the projected net earnings JKK2 and the projected actual after-injury-net
earnings GHH. This may be a continuing loss which can never quite be
regained (explains why the two projections never meet). The line GHH,
01 Wicker v. Hoppack, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 94 (1867).
9 2 Bigelow v. RKO Pictures, Inc., 150 F.2d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 1945). For discussions see
Guilfoil, Damages, supra note 66; Comment, Monetary Recovery Under Federal Antitrust Statutes,
45 TExAs L. REv. 856 (1967).
113 Lloyd v. Lloyd Bros. Pharmacists, Inc., 29 Ohio L. Abs. 225 (C.P. Ham. Co. 1939).
9 4Bosland, supra note 33; Dewing, supra note 43, at 376.
O, Lloyd v. Lloyd Bros. Pharmacists, Inc., 29 Ohio L. Abs. 225 (C.P. Ham. Co. 1939).
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in the diagram is strictly a conjectual representation used to show possibly
continuing damages.
The value of a going business is best determined by capitalizing net
earnings with an appropriate rate of capitalization. Damage resulting
in the loss of value of a business should logically be determined in a
like mannerY7 That part of the damage which causes a continuing im-
pact on property rights should be capitalized rather than just accounted
for like lost profits before the trial. This capitalized amount shows the
value of the continuing loss and should be added (where appropriate) to
the triangle of lost profits based on temporary damages (FGJ).98
This "full value theory" requires an expert opinion and a judicial de-
cision on amount of continuing damage. This is difficult, but without it
the measure of compensatory damages is not met. No legal decision can
fully reinstate "what would have been," but it can determine a money
value for it.
TABLE :1
DATE OFTRI AL PLUS 
"
DATE OF K
WRONGFUL ACT
TIME -T
AH
_ ACrUAL EARNINGS T
G PLUS
Dat
Present Legal Solution is: CDG
Full Value Solution is: FIG, where effect of injury ceases on Date of Trial
FIG, plus Annual loss of profits in year subsequent to Date
of Trial (JKHG), Multiplied by Appropriate Rate of
Capitalization.
9 6 DEwiNG, supra note 43, at 286, 287.
7 Taylor v. B. Heller & Co., 364 F.2d 608, 612 (1966):
1. Measurement of damages [is] difference between value of the business before
and after injury or destruction.
2. T]he real relevance of past profits ... is for computation of the value of the
business as a going concern, through the capitalization of past earnings at an ap-
propriate rate.
98 The proper measure of continuing loss might be JKHG (loss first year after the trial)
multiplied by an appropriate rate of capitalization.
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